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Abstract 
 
This study aimed to provide evidence of whether or not the corporate performance indicators of the Jordanian 
companies listed at Amman Stock Exchange are affected by corporate governance variables that were proposed, 
and to provide important indicator of the relationship of corporate governance dimensions (Board size and 
ownership structure) and performance that can be used by the Jordanian firms to solve the agency problem. The 
study sample consists of 90 listed Jordanian firms over the period from 2010 to 2014, the first 30 firms are from 
industrial sector, the second 30 are from financial sector ,and the last 30 firms are from services sector, the 
characteristic of the sample is cross-sectional and of time series. Multi regression analyses were applied for each 
sector and for all sectors together. The study found that all listed Jordanian companies together and industrial 
sector have a significant positive relationship between corporate governance variables on one side, and return on 
assets, return on equity on the other side, but price on earnings ratio is not affected by corporate governance 
variables in all listed companies and in each sector. Return on assets in finance and services sectors is the only 
performance variable that is affected by corporate governance variables. 
Keywords: corporate governance, corporate performance, board size, ownership structure 
1. Introduction 
  
The term “corporate governance” is relatively new terminology used in both public and academic debates, 
although the issues it addresses have been around for much longer. In the last two decades, however, corporate 
governance issues have become important not only in the academic literature, but also in public policy debates. 
Corporate Governance is concerned with ways in which all parties interested in the well-being of the firm (the 
stakeholders) attempt to ensure that managers and other insiders are always taking appropriate measures or adopt 
mechanisms that safeguard the interests of the stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), Such measures are 
important because of the separation of ownership from management, an increasingly vital feature of the modern 
corporations. A typical firm is characterized by numerous owners having no management role, and with 
managers with no equity interest in the firm. Shareholders are often large in number, and an average shareholder 
controls a very small proportion of the shares of the firm. This gives rise to the tendency for such a shareholder 
to take no interest in the monitoring of managers who may pursue interests different from those of the owners of 
equity. The compatibility of corporate governance practices with global standards has also become an important 
part of corporate success. The practices of good corporate governance have therefore become a necessary 
prerequisite for any corporation to be managed effectively in the global market, also it helps the corporation to 
use the scarce resources efficiently and comply with the rules, regulations and prospects of society which could 
improve its performance and benefit the society as  Al Manaseer, et al. (2012) mentioned. 
  
During this period, corporate governance has been identified with takeovers, financial restructuring, and 
institutional investors' activism, corporate governance deals with the ways in which providers of capital to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. Corporate-governance mechanisms assure 
investors in corporations that they will receive adequate returns on their investments, if these mechanisms did 
not exist or did not function properly, outside investors would not lend firms or buy their equity securities, then 
businesses would be forced to rely entirely on their own internally generated cash flows and accumulated 
financial resources to finance ongoing operations as well as profitable investment opportunities. Therefore the 
overall economic performance likely would suffer because many good business opportunities would be missed 
and financial distress at individual firms would spread quickly to other firms, employees, and consumers. 
 
Many studies examined corporate governance in emerging markets,( e.g ., Al-halabi, 2009; Al manaseer, 2013; 
Qabaja, 2008), researchers have studied the implications of the concentrated corporate ownership which is 
common in many emerging and developing markets, thus they concluded that the principal agency problem in 
large corporations (in any country) represented by the restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by the 
controlling shareholders. 
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This study is interested in finding some factors of governance that affect the Jordanian firms’ performance 
(profitability), also to examine whether or not the corporate performance indicators of the Jordanian listed 
companies are affected by corporate governance factors such as ownership structure and size of board of 
directors to enhance the role of corporate governance and make it more effective, this could help to solve the 
agency problem. Also this study will provide a theoretical background in corporate governance and corporate 
performance. 
 
2.1 Literature review 
There has been an explosion in empirical research in corporate governance following the accounting scandals of 
Enron and WorldCom in 2002. Some researchers empirically found that good corporate governance positively 
affects firm performance and market value (e.g., Brown & Caylor, 2006 ,2009; Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007; 
Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 2003). Most of these studies focus on corporate governance in developed markets, 
especially the US equity markets, The purpose of corporate governance is to achieve the best overall welfare of 
all stakeholders and promote economic efficiency both internally and externally, empirical research on corporate 
governance is based on the theoretical framework of agency theory advanced by Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
agency theory considers separate leadership structure, outside directors and board committees as optimal 
monitoring devices that will maximize the value of firms. Stewardship theory views managers as stewards of the 
corporation and considers that a combined leadership structure and insider dominated boards are likely to 
maximize shareholder wealth, the adoption of corporate governance was also stimulated by the belief that the 
economic crisis that hit the South East Asian stock markets in 1997-1998 was partly due to weak corporate 
governance in the region. 
One key element of improving microeconomic efficiency is corporate governance (Maher & Andersson, 1999). 
Corporate governance affects the development and functioning of capital markets and exerts a strong influence 
on resource allocation. It impacts upon the behaviour and performance of firms, innovative activity, 
entrepreneurship, and the development of an active SME sector (small and medium sized enterprises). Because 
of increasing capital mobility and globalisation, corporate governance has become an important framework 
condition affecting the industrial competitiveness. Meanwhile, in transition economies, privatisation has raised 
questions about the way in which private enterprises should be governed, it is thought that poor corporate 
governance mechanisms in these countries have proved, in part, to be a major impediment to improve the 
competitiveness of firms. Better corporate governance, should manifest itself in enhanced corporate performance 
and can lead to higher economic growth. The fundamental of corporate governance is to promote fairness, 
transparency, accountability as well as guide corporate bodies in their action and deed (Emmanuel & Hodo, 
2012).  
However, there is no single model of corporate governance. Governance practices vary not only across countries 
but also across firms and sectors. However, one of the most striking differences between countries’ corporate 
governance systems is in the ownership and control of firms that exists across countries. Systems of corporate 
governance can be distinguished according to the degree of ownership and control and the identity of controlling 
shareholders. While some systems are characterised by wide dispersed ownership (outsider systems), others tend 
to be characterised by concentrated ownership or control (insider systems). In outsider systems of corporate 
governance (notably the US and UK) the basic conflict of interest is between strong managers and widely-
dispersed weak shareholders. In insider systems (notably Continental Europe and Japan), on the other hand, the 
basic conflict is between controlling shareholders and weak minority shareholders. However, these differences 
are also rooted in variations in countries’ legal, regulatory, and institutional environments, as well as historical 
and cultural factors. Therefore, policies that promote the adoption of specific forms of governance should 
attempt to account for the product and factor market contexts, and other institutional factors, within which they 
are being contemplated. 
Corporate governance comprises two mechanisms (as in many studies), internal and external corporate 
governance. Internal corporate governance, giving priority to shareholders’ interest, operates on the board of 
directors to monitor top management. On the other hand, external corporate governance monitors and controls 
managers’ behaviours by means of external regulations and force, in which many parties involved, such as 
suppliers, debtors, accountants, lawyers, providers of credit ratings and investment bank. 
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2.2 Other previous studies  
Maher, M., and Andersson, T. (1999): This document examined the effect of corporate governance on corporate 
performance and economic performance. It first recapitulated and built on previous work undertaken by DSTI, it 
gave a more explicit exposition of the shareholder and stakeholder models of corporate governance. It then 
addressed some of the underlying factors that promote efficient corporate governance, and examined some of the 
strengths, weaknesses, and economic implications associated with various corporate governance systems. In 
addition to providing data not presented in the previous work, it also provided newly available information on 
ownership concentration and voting rights in a number of OECD countries. The document also provided a 
survey of empirical evidence on the link between corporate governance, firm performance and economic growth. 
Black, B., et al. (2010):  They confirmed the association between governance and value using panel data on 
Korean public companies over 1998-2004. Firms with higher scores on an overall Korean corporate governance 
index (KCGI) have higher Tobin's q. Shareholder rights and board procedure subindices are not significant.  For 
firms with higher KCGI scores: (i) related party transactions are less adverse to firm value; (ii) firm profitability 
is more sensitive to shocks to industry profitability; (iii) capital expenditures are lower, but investment is more 
sensitive to profitability and growth opportunities; (iv) sales growth is lower; (v) profitability is more sensitive to 
growth opportunities; (vi) lagged board structure is associated with higher firm profitability; and (vii) dividends 
are higher, controlling for profits, and are more sensitive to profits. Board structure is associated with the first six 
channels; parity with the third, fourth, and sixth, and disclosure with the fifth. A 2SLS analysis (using 1999 legal 
rules which apply to large firms to instrument for board structure) offers evidence that the link between board 
structure and firm value, and between board structure and these channels, is likely to be causal.  
Qabaja, A. (2008): He studied the impact of corporate governance effectiveness on the financial performance of 
the listed companies on the Palestine Securities Exchange (PSE). A Stratified random sample of 20 companies 
was selected which represented 71.4% of the population that is 28 companies listed on the PSE in 2005,  a 
simple and multiple regression was used to determine the impact of the independent variable that represented the 
corporate governance effectiveness on the dependent variable which represented financial performance measured 
by return on equity, return on investment, price earnings ratio, market to book value, Tobin's q and daily stock 
volatility.  The most important result was the existence of a statistical significant positive relationship between 
the corporate governance effectiveness on one side and the return on equity, return on investment, price earnings 
ratio, market to book value on the other side. A negative statistical significant relationship between corporate 
governance effectiveness and daily stock volatility was found. 
Rogers, M. (2008): This paper aims at establishing the relationship between the core principles of corporate 
governance and financial performance in commercial banks of Uganda. Findings indicated that corporate 
governance predicts 34.5 % of the variance in the general financial performance of commercial banks in Uganda. 
However the significant contributors to financial performance include openness and reliability that are measures 
of trust. On the other hand credit risk as a measure of disclosure has a negative relationship with financial 
performance. The data was analyzed using descriptive analysis options of SPSS, Pearson’s correlation’s 
statistical techniques were used to test and establish whether there exists a relationship between transparency, 
disclosure, trust and financial performance while multiple regression analysis was used to test the potential 
predictors of the dependent variable. Pearson correlation technique was adopted given that the dependent 
variable was converted to interval data in five scales in order to correlate it with the independent variables that 
were ranked on a five point likert scale.                                                
 Al-halabi, N. (2009): He studied the role of governance in increasing profitability of industrial private firms in 
Syria by examining two variables: 1- The level of reliance on organizational structure of firms to make the 
economic decisions and increase the profitability, 2- The extent of ISO 9001 system’s contribution in 
establishing administrative and financial basics that can limit the informal activities and increase the productive 
efficiency and performance level. 
Sami, H., et al. (2011): They investigated the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and valuation 
in China. It was the first study to use a composite measure of corporate governance to examine the impact of 
corporate governance on Chinese firms’ performance and valuation. They found that the composite measure of 
corporate governance is positively and significantly associated with firm performance and valuation.  Ownership 
concentration and board independence have a positive impact on firm performance and valuation. They also 
found that firm value increases with foreign ownership and firm performance decreases with state ownership.  
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Heenetigala, K., and Armstrong, A. (2011): This study tested the relationship between corporate governance 
practices and firm performance. Data were obtained from the annual reports of a sample of 37 companies 
selected from the top 50 listed companies in The Lanka Monthly Digest 50 (LMD) for the years 2003 and 2007. 
The data were analysed using Spearman correlations and analysis of variance. They confirmed a positive 
relationship between governance practices (separate leadership, board composition, board committee) and firm 
performance. These relationships indicate that firms have implemented corporate governance strategies, which 
have resulted in higher profitability and share price.  
 
Amba, S. (2012): This paper examined the impact of corporate governance variables on firms’ financial 
performance. Influence of corporate governance variables CEO duality, Chairman of Audit Committee, 
Proportion of Non-executive Directors, Concentrated Ownership structure, Institutional Investors, Gearing Ratio 
on firms’ financial performance “Return on Assets” is researched using the firms traded in Bahrain bourse. He 
found that corporate governance variables do influence firms’ performance. CEO duality, proportion of non-
executive directors and leverage has negative influence, and board member as chair of audit committee, 
proportion of institutional ownership has positive influence on firms’ financial performance. 
 
Emmanuel S, A., and Hodo B, R. (2012): This study examined the relationship between corporate governance 
and banks profitability in Nigeria. The study discovered that good corporate governance and not assets value 
determined the profitability of banks in Nigeria, it identified that a unit change in the size of the board of 
directors of the bank and the size of shareholders (Corporate Governance) increases return on assets and return 
on equity between 2 percent and 18 percent within the study period. It also showed that it is not the quantum of 
total assets or equity that determines bank performance in Nigeria. Rather the quality of the asset, equity 
providers and managers that actually influences bank performance.  
 
3. The importance of the study   
1- The study may provide additional empirical evidence on the influence of corporate governance on the 
financial performance (profitability) of the listed companies in Jordan. 
2- It will help the investors in capital market to predict the future performance of listed companies and their 
ability to continue in operations (going concern) to make better investment decisions. 
3- It could reveal the relationship of corporate governance and firms’ performance that can be used by the 
Jordanian firms to solve the agency problem.     
 
4. The problem of the study 
 The main question of this research: does corporate governance (measured by ownership structure and number of 
board of directors) have impact on the profitability of the companies (measured by return on assets, return on 
equity and price on earnings ratio) in each sector and in all sectors together? 
 
5. The limitation of the study 
The first limitation of this study is taking only two corporate governance factors, and that because of my limited 
time available to conduct and accomplish this study, although I took  sufficient sample from the total listed 
companies in Jordan over 2010-2014, I would prefer to study other governance dimensions. The second 
limitation is that employing proxies for actual corporate governance mechanisms and banks' performance 
outcomes may not accurately capture the actual mechanisms or outcomes experienced by banks in the financial 
marketplace. 
 
6. The objectives of the study 
The objectives of this research is to study the impact of corporate governance variables ( Ownership structure, 
and number of board of directors) on firm’s profitability ratios( Return on Assets, Return on Equity and Price on 
Earnings ratio) in each sector and in all sectors together. 
 
7. Methodology 
7.1 The variables of the study 
 
This research followed most previous studies in selecting the most variables (Al Manaseer, et al., 2012;  Berger, 
et al. ,2004;  Emmanuel & Hodo, 2012; Rogers, 2008; Sami, et al., 2011), but Al manaseer (2013) and Qabaja 
(2008) chose P/E ratio as additional indicator for profitability.  
The independent variables (corporate governance measures): 
1- The ownership structure: sum of the shares (% of total) that are owned by those who own 5% or more. 
2- The number of board of directors. 
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The control variables: 
These variables are used to investigate if there are other than corporate governance variables that may affect the 
dependent variable (performance), therefore I used: 
1- The natural logarithm of total asset (firm size). 
The dependent variables (profitability measures): 
1- ROA: return on asset which equals after tax net income divided by the average of total assets of the company. 
2- ROE: return on equity which equals after tax net income divided by total equity of the company. 
3- P/E: price on earnings ratio which equals market price per share divided by earning per share.  
 
7.2 Conceptual framework 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual frame work, the independent, dependent and control variables. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
                                                                                                             
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
                                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The conceptual frame work. 
 
7.3 The hypotheses 
 
Corporate governance affects the development and functioning of capital markets and exerts a strong influence 
on resource allocation. In an era of increasing capital mobility and globalisation, it has also become an important 
framework condition affecting the industrial competitiveness, in addition it is important variable that affect the 
financial performance of companies according to many previous studies. Based on the agency theory (Fama, 
1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) we are interested in examining how corporate 
governance affects firm performance. Boards of directors may have a difficulty communicating with each other 
in a large size board, which causes great detriment to firm performance. Eisenberg et al. (1998), Singh and 
Davidson (2003) and Yermack (1996) proved that board size has a negative relation with firm performance, 
implying that, in a large size board, the diversity of insiders’ opinion has a negative impact on making decisions, 
which is detrimental to firm performance, also they found that insider ownership has a positive and significant 
relation with firm performance, suggesting that higher insider ownership may reconcile authorities’ and outside 
shareholders’ interests, consequently making firm performance better. This research followed most previous 
studies in selecting the hypotheses (Berger, et al., 2004; Emmanuel & Hodo, 2012; Rogers, 2008; Sami et al., 
2011); on the other hand, Al manaseer (2013) and Qabaja (2008) chose P/E ratio as indicator for profitability. 
This paper proposes the hypotheses as follows: 
 
1- Hypothesis H0 1: There is no significant relationship between the corporate governance and return on assets 
(test it for the all 90 listed companies and for specific sector in Jordan). 
 
Corporate governance 
(independent variables) 
Measured by: 
1- Ownership structure. 
2- Size of board of directors. 
Profitability 
(dependent variables) 
Measured by: 
1- ROA. 
2- ROE. 
3- P/E. 
Control 
variables 
1- Ln (total 
assets). 
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ROAit     = α + β1BSit + β2OSit + β3TAit + eit 
ROAit : return on assets for firm i at year t. 
BSit : board size for firm i at year t. 
OSit : ownership structure for firm i at year t. 
TAit : Ln(total asset) for firm i at year t. 
eit : error term for firm i at year t. 
 
2- Hypothesis H0 2: There is no significant relationship between the corporate governance and return on equity 
(test it for the all 90 listed companies and for specific sector in Jordan). 
 
ROEit     = α + β1BSit + β2OSit + β3TAit + eit 
ROEit : return on equity for firm i at year t. 
 
3- Hypothesis H0 3: There is no significant relationship between the corporate governance and price on earnings 
ratio (test it for the all 90 listed companies and for specific sector in Jordan). 
 
P/Eit     = α + β1BSit + β2OSit + β3TAit + eit 
P/Eit    :  price on earnings ratio for firm i at year t. 
 
7.4 Data sample and data collection method 
The study sample consists of 90 listed Jordanian firms over the period from 2010 to 2014 (90*5 years= 450 
observations), the first 30 firms (first 150 observations) are from industrial sector, the second 30  (second 150 
observations)are from financial sector ,and the last 30 firms ( last 150 observations)are from services sector, the 
90 companies were chosen randomly due to their available annual reports from 2010 to 2014, I calculated ROA 
and ROE for all companies because they are missing in some companies’ annual reports and because some of 
them were overestimated (after rounding), also they were computed in different ways across companies and in 
the same company across time ( E.g., ROA= net income/Total assets or ROA=net income/ average of total 
assets). Panel data is used to generate more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among variables, 
more degrees of freedom, and more efficiency. Furthermore,   panel data is used to eliminate the autocorrelation 
of variables in time series and heteroskedasticity of individuals in cross section. 
 
The data were collected from the Jordanian shareholding companies guide, the annual reports of all listed 
companies which published in Amman Stock Exchange’s website, more details were collected from Securities 
Depository Center's Website. 
 
7.5 Statistic analysis tools 
A range of data analysis techniques were used: 
The data was analyzed using descriptive analysis options of SPSS. 
Thereafter, multiple regression analysis was used to test the potential predictors of the dependent  variable, 
finally F- test was used to test the acceptance or rejection of the null hypotheses. 
 
8. The statistical analysis, conclusions and implications 
 
8.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 1: Mean, standard  deviation , minimum and maximum  are used to describe the variables for the 90 
companies. 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Max Min 
ROA % .92 9.22 39.9 -55.8 
ROE % 1.75 28.14 297.7 -198.6 
P/E 33.51 286.88 5690 -296.9 
TOTAL ASSETS 275117702 623383882 3554739368 1511192 
OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURE 
.582 .21 .986 .067 
BOARD SIZE 8.84 2.41 14 4 
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From table 1 you can see the following: 
 ROA has mean of .92%, standard deviation of 9.22, maximum value of 39.9 (for Jordanian Duty Free Shops in 
services sector in 2010), and minimum value of -55.8 (for Jordan Ceramic Industries in industry sector in 2013). 
ROE has mean of 1.75%, standard deviation of 28.14, maximum value of 297.7 (for The Holy Land Insurance in 
finance sector in 2012), and minimum value of -198.6 (for Royal Jordanian Air Lines in services sector in 2013). 
P/E has mean of 33.51, standard deviation of 286.88, maximum value of 5690 (for Union Tobacco Industries in 
industry sector in 2014), and minimum value of -296.9 (for Jordan Cement Factories in industry sector in 2010). 
Total assets has mean of 275117702, standard deviation of 623383882, maximum value of   3554739368 (for 
Jordan Islamic Bank in finance sector in 2014), and minimum value of 1511192 (for Pearl Sanitary Paper 
Converting in industry sector in 2013). 
Ownership structure has mean of .582, standard deviation of .21, maximum value of .986 (for Jordan Phosphate 
Mines in industry sector in 2012), and minimum value of .067 (for Jordan Steel Group in industry sector).   
Board size has mean of 8.84, standard deviation of 2.41, maximum value of 14 (for Jordan Worsted Mills in 
industry sector), and minimum value of 4 (for Al-Arabiya For Investment Projects in industry sector in 2013).  
   
8.2 Multicollinearity test 
 
VIF test is used to test Multicollinearity between the independent variables , it is found that VIF is less than 10, 
that means there is no Multicollinearity between the variables, as shown in the table 2. 
 
Table 2: Collinearity table. 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
Board.s .743 1.346 
O.S .929 1.077 
Ln Assets .745 1.343 
 
Autocorrelation test 
D.W. test is used to the autocorrelation of the data, it is found that D.W. values for each hypothesis is less than 4 
that means there is no autocorrletation. 
8.3 Hypotheses testing 
Hypothesis H0 1: There is no significant relationship between the corporate governance and return on assets in 
the listed companies in Jordan. 
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Tables of R1: Model summary & Coefficients for regression1. 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square F Sig. Durbin-Watson 
1 .330a .109 18.142 .000a 1.136 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -24.602- 3.972  -6.193- .000 
Board.s .120 .198 .031 .604 .546 
O.S 8.835 2.001 .205 4.415 .000 
Ln Assets 1.102 .258 .222 4.278 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA % 
From the tables of R1 you find: 
Multiple regression is used to test above hypothesis, it is found that r= 0.33 is significant at 0.05 level that means 
there is a medium relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, also , above tables 
show that the independent variables explain 10.9% of the variance in the dependent variable since r2 = 0.109. 
Also above tables show that F value= 18.142 is significant at 0.05 level that means the independent variables 
have an effect on dependent variable. As well as the coefficients table shows that t value for O.S and Ln assets 
variables are significant at 0.05 level that means: 
• Board size has no effect on the dependent variable. 
• O.S has an effect on the dependent variable 
• Assets have an effect on the dependent variable. 
 
Hypothesis H0 2: There is no significant relationship between the corporate governance and return on equity  in 
the listed companies in Jordan. 
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Tables of R2: Model summary & Coefficients for regression2. 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square F Sig. Durbin-Watson 
1 .227a .051 8.050 .000a 2.174 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -57.621- 12.513  -4.605- .000 
Board.s .371 .625 .032 .594 .553 
O.S 10.454 6.304 .079 1.658 .098 
Ln Assets 2.850 .811 .188 3.514 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: ROE % 
From the tables of R2 you find: 
Multiple regression is used to test above hypothesis, it is found that r= 0.227 is significant at 0.05 level that 
means there is a weak relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, also , above 
tables show that the independent variables explain 5.1% of the variance in the dependent variable since r2 = 
0.051. 
Also above tables show that F value= 8.05 is significant at 0.05 level that means the independent variables have 
an effect on dependent variable. As well as the coefficients table shows that t value for Ln assets variable is 
significant at 0.05 level that means: 
• Board size has no effect on the dependent variable. 
• O.S has no effect on the dependent variable 
• Assets have an effect on the dependent variable. 
 
Hypothesis H0 3: There is no significant relationship between the corporate governance and price on earnings 
ratio in the listed companies in Jordan. 
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Tables of R3: Model summary & Coefficients for regression 3. 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square F Sig. Durbin-Watson 
1 .045a .002 .301 .824a 1.959 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -31.280- 130.861  -.239- .811 
Board.s 1.514 6.532 .013 .232 .817 
O.S 57.264 65.927 .043 .869 .386 
Ln Assets 1.031 8.483 .007 .122 .903 
a. Dependent Variable: P/E 
From the tables of R3 you find: 
Multiple regression is used to test above hypothesis, it is found that r= 0.045 is not significant at 0.05 level that 
means there is no  relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, also , above tables 
show that the independent variables explain 0.2% of the variance in the dependent variable since r2 = 0.002. 
Also above tables show that F value= 0.301 is not significant at 0.05 level that means the independent variables 
have no effect on dependent variable. As well as the coefficients table shows that t value for each variable is not 
significant at 0.05 level that means: 
• Board size has no effect on the dependent variable. 
• O.S has no effect on the dependent variable 
• Assets have no effect on the dependent variable. 
 
Hypothesis H0 1: There is no significant relationship between the corporate governance and return on assets in 
industrial sector in Jordan. 
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Tables of R4: Model summary & Coefficients for regression 4. 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square F Sig. 
1 .449a .202 12.319 .000a 
 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -43.534- 7.530  -5.781- .000 
Board.s .017 .318 .005 .053 .958 
O.S 5.237 2.918 .138 1.795 .075 
Ln Assets 2.409 .515 .404 4.680 .000 
a. sector = industrial    b. Dependent Variable: ROA % 
From the tables of R4 you find: 
Multiple regression is used to test above hypothesis, it is found that r= 0.449 is significant at 0.05 level that 
means there is a medium relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, also , above 
tables show that the independent variables explain 20.2% of the variance in the dependent variable since r2 = 
0.202. 
Also above tables show that F value= 12.319  is significant at 0.05 level that means the independent variables 
have an effect on dependent variable. As well as the coefficients table shows that t value for Ln (assets) variable 
is significant at 0.05 level that means: 
• Board size has no effect on the dependent variable. 
• O.S has no effect on the dependent variable 
• Assets have an effect on the dependent variable. 
 
Hypothesis H0 1: There is no significant relationship between the corporate governance and return on assets in 
finance sector in Jordan. 
 
  
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.8, No.23, 2016 
 
154 
Tables of R5: Model summary & Coefficients for regression 5. 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square F Sig. 
1 .349a .122 6.764 .000a 
 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -17.886- 5.128  -3.488- .001 
Board.s .353 .395 .092 .893 .373 
O.S 12.985 3.972 .301 3.270 .001 
Ln Assets .382 .361 .108 1.056 .293 
a. sector = finance    b. Dependent Variable: ROA % 
From the tables of R5 you find: 
Multiple regression is used to test above hypothesis, it is found that r= 0.349 is significant at 0.05 level that 
means there is a medium relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, also , above 
tables show that the independent variables explain 12.2% of the variance in the dependent variable since r2 = 
0.122. 
Also above tables show that F value= 6.764  is significant at 0.05 level that means the independent variables 
have an effect on dependent variable. As well as the coefficients table shows that t value for O.S variable is 
significant at 0.05 level that means: 
• Board size has no effect on the dependent variable. 
• O.S has an effect on the dependent variable 
• Assets have no effect on the dependent variable. 
 
Hypothesis H0 1: There is no significant relationship between the corporate governance and return on assets in 
services sector in Jordan. 
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Tables of R6: Model summary & Coefficients for regression 6.  
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square F Sig. 
1 .261a .068 3.567 .016a 
 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -29.556- 10.812  -2.734- .007 
Board.s .007 .342 .002 .021 .984 
O.S 8.958 4.083 .178 2.194 .030 
Ln Assets 1.530 .624 .219 2.452 .015 
a. sector = services    b. Dependent Variable: ROA % 
From the tables of R6 you find: 
Multiple regression is used to test above hypothesis, it is found that r= 0.261 is significant at 0.05 level that 
means there is a weak relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, also , above 
tables show that the independent variables explain 6.8% of the variance in the dependent variable since r2 = 
0.068. 
Also above tables show that F value= 3.567  is significant at 0.05 level that means the independent variables 
have an effect on dependent variable. As well as the coefficients table shows that t value for O.S and Ln assets 
variables are significant at 0.05 level that means: 
• Board size has no effect on the dependent variable. 
• O.S has an effect on the dependent variable 
• Assets have an effect on the dependent variable. 
 
Hypothesis H0 2: There is no significant relationship between the corporate governance and return on equity in 
industrial sector in Jordan. 
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Tables of R7: Model summary & Coefficients for regression7. 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square F Sig. 
1 .347a .120 6.657 .000a 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -72.755- 17.677  -4.116- .000 
Board.s .296 .746 .036 .397 .692 
O.S 13.591 6.849 .160 1.984 .049 
Ln Assets 3.569 1.208 .267 2.954 .004 
a. sector = industrial    b. Dependent Variable: ROE % 
From the tables of R7 you find: 
Multiple regression is used to test above hypothesis, it is found that r= 0.347 is significant at 0.05 level that 
means there is a medium  relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, also , 
above tables show that the independent variables explain 12% of the variance in the dependent variable since r2 
= 0.12. 
Also above tables show that F value= 6.657  is significant at 0.05 level that means the independent variables 
have an effect on dependent variable. As well as the coefficients table shows that t value for O.S and Ln assets 
variables are significant at 0.05 level that means: 
• Board size has no effect on the dependent variable. 
• O.S has an effect on the dependent variable 
• Assets have an effect on the dependent variable. 
 
Hypothesis H0 2: There is no significant relationship between the corporate governance and return on equity  in 
finance sector in Jordan. 
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Tables of R8: Model summary & Coefficients for regression 8.  
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square F Sig. 
1 .141a .020 .986 .401a 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -30.093- 20.871  -1.442- .151 
Board.s .766 1.609 .052 .476 .635 
O.S 10.536 16.165 .063 .652 .516 
Ln Assets 1.192 1.471 .087 .810 .419 
a. sector = finance     b. Dependent Variable: ROE % 
From the tables of R8 you find: 
Multiple regression is used to test above hypothesis, it is found that r= 0.141 is not significant at 0.05 level that 
means there is no  relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, also , above tables 
show that the independent variables explain 2% of the variance in the dependent variable since r2 = 0.02. 
Also above tables show that F value= 0.986 is not significant at 0.05 level that means the independent variables 
have no effect on dependent variable. As well as the coefficients table shows that t value for each variable is not 
significant at 0.05 level that means: 
• Board size has no effect on the dependent variable. 
• O.S has no effect on the dependent variable 
• Assets have no effect on the dependent variable. 
 
Hypothesis H0 2: There is no significant relationship between the corporate governance and return on equity in 
services sector in Jordan. 
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Tables of R9: Model summary & Coefficients for regression 9.  
Variables Entered/Removedb,c 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Ln Assets, O.S, 
Board.s 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered.   b. sector = services 
c. Dependent Variable: ROE % 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square F Sig. 
1 .191a .037 1.848 .141a 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Ln Assets, O.S, Board.s.     b. sector = services 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -77.686- 35.468  -2.190- .030 
Board.s .006 1.123 .000 .005 .996 
O.S 7.035 13.393 .043 .525 .600 
Ln Assets 4.344 2.047 .193 2.122 .036 
a. sector = services       b. Dependent Variable: ROE % 
From the tables of R9 you find: 
Multiple regression is used to test above hypothesis, it is found that r= 0.191 is not significant at 0.05 level that 
means there is no  relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, also , above tables 
show that the independent variables explain 3.7% of the variance in the dependent variable since r2 = 0.037. 
Also above tables show that F value= 1.848 is not significant at 0.05 level that means the independent variables 
have no effect on dependent variable. As well as the coefficients table shows that t value for Ln assets variable is 
significant at 0.05 level that means: 
• Board size has no effect on the dependent variable. 
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• O.S has no effect on the dependent variable 
• Assets have an effect on the dependent variable. 
 
Hypothesis H0 3: There is no significant relationship between the corporate governance and price on earnings 
ratio in industrial sector in Jordan. 
Tables of R10: Model summary & Coefficients for regression10. 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square F Sig. 
1 .120a .014 .708 .548a 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Ln Assets, O.S, Board.s.      b. sector = industrial 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -443.452- 419.665  -1.057- .292 
Board.s 1.338 17.719 .007 .075 .940 
O.S 131.794 162.606 .069 .811 .419 
Ln Assets 25.242 28.687 .084 .880 .380 
a. sector = industrial       b. Dependent Variable: P/E 
From the tables of R10 you find: 
Multiple regression is used to test above hypothesis, it is found that r= 0.12 is not significant at 0.05 level that 
means there is no  relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, also , above tables 
show that the independent variables explain 1.4% of the variance in the dependent variable since r2 = 0.014. 
Also above tables show that F value= 0.708 is not significant at 0.05 level that means the independent variables 
have no effect on dependent variable. As well as the coefficients table shows that t value for each variable is not 
significant at 0.05 level that means: 
• Board size has no effect on the dependent variable. 
• O.S has no effect on the dependent variable 
• Assets have no effect on the dependent variable. 
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Hypothesis H0 3: There is no significant relationship between the corporate governance and price on earnings 
ratio in finance sector in Jordan. 
Tables of R11: Model summary & Coefficients for regression11. 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square F Sig. 
1 .043a .002 .089 .966a 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Ln Assets, O.S, Board.s.     b. sector = finance 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 26.107 58.912  .443 .658 
Board.s 1.538 4.541 .037 .339 .735 
O.S -6.126- 45.630 -.013- -.134- .893 
Ln Assets -1.147- 4.151 -.030- -.276- .783 
a. sector = finance       b. Dependent Variable: P/E 
From the tables of R11 you find: 
Multiple regression is used to test above hypothesis, it is found that r= 0.043 is not significant at 0.05 level that 
means there is no  relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, also , above tables 
show that the independent variables explain 0.2% of the variance in the dependent variable since r2 = 0.002. 
Also above tables show that F value= 0.089 is not significant at 0.05 level that means the independent variables 
have no effect on dependent variable. As well as the coefficients table shows that t value for each variable is not 
significant at 0.05 level that means: 
• Board size has no effect on the dependent variable. 
• O.S has no effect on the dependent variable 
• Assets have no effect on the dependent variable. 
 
Hypothesis H0 3: There is no significant relationship between the corporate governance and price on earnings 
ratio in services sector in Jordan. 
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Tables of R12: Model summary & Coefficients for regression12. 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square F Sig. 
1 .063a .004 .193 .901a 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Ln Assets, O.S, Board.s.      b. sector = services 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 93.110 120.847  .770 .442 
Board.s -1.521- 3.825 -.037- -.398- .691 
O.S -10.068- 45.633 -.018- -.221- .826 
Ln Assets -2.866- 6.976 -.038- -.411- .682 
a. sector = services     b. Dependent Variable: P/E 
From the tables of R12 you find: 
Multiple regression is used to test above hypothesis, it is found that r= 0.063 is not significant at 0.05 level that 
means there is no  relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, also , above tables 
show that the independent variables explain 0.4% of the variance in the dependent variable since r2 = 0.004. 
Also above tables show that F value= 0.193 is not significant at 0.05 level that means the independent variables 
have no effect on dependent variable. As well as the coefficients table shows that t value for each variable is not 
significant at 0.05 level that means: 
• Board size has no effect on the dependent variable. 
• O.S has no effect on the dependent variable 
• Assets have no effect on the dependent variable. 
 
The results of this study are consistent with the most previous studies’ results, most of them found positive 
relationship between the corporate governance variables on one side and ROA and ROE on the other side, The 
significant positive relationships that were found indicate that some firms have implemented an effective 
corporate governance strategies which have resulted in higher profitability, but share price or P/E variable is not 
affected at all by corporate governance indicators which implies that Amman Stock Exchange is inefficient at the 
weak form level, i.e. it has improper and inefficient pricing and this is confirmed by many studies (e.g., 
Alhabashneh,  2015; Ananzeh, 2016; Jaradat & Al-Zeaud, 2011; Mohamad, 2014; and others). 
  
Some weak relationships were found because of the lack of corporate governance practices, their ineffectiveness, 
or because of the lack of awareness of the importance of the governance impact on the corporate performance. 
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The fact of the bad economic reality in Jordan, the bad management and an ineffective governance practices may 
give a strong explanation of these results. 
  
8.4 Recommendation 
  
1- Conduct further studies taking into consideration other firms or other variables haven't been taken by this 
study, or trying other time period. 
2- The Jordanian companies have to focus on improving their corporate governance practices, which will lead to 
enhance their firm’s value by: a- Excessive efforts should be exerted by Jordanian firm in cooperation with 
Jordanian Securities Commission (JSC) and other regulatory bodies to adopt standard classification of items in 
the financial statements by assigning each element a uniform code to be used always in entering, processing data. 
b- Providing shareholders with periodic reports on changes affecting the shareholders in the company. c- 
Companies have to implement the corporate governance rules related to shareholder equity due to their impact 
on ROA and P/E. d- Compliance with corporate governance rules pertaining to the nomination and remuneration 
committee to ensure that the current needs of the companies and their boards are met. e- The system for granting 
rewards to employees should base on performance and that the remuneration arrangements support the strategic 
objectives of the corporate entity. f- Corporate governance rules and regulations should be effective to provide a 
tool of choosing the best executives to control the scarce resources and improve the performance and the value 
of the firm.  
 
References 
 Alhabashneh, A. (2015). Evolving Efficiency of Amman Stock Exchange. Interdisciplinary Journal Of        
Contemporary Research In Business, 6(10), 36-46. 
 
Al-halabi, N. (2009). The role of governance in increasing profitability of industrial private firms  in Syria.               
Damascus university magazine , 25(2), 201-238. 
 
Al Manaseer, M., et al. (2012). The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Performance of Jordanian Banks.  
European Journal of Scientific Research, 67 (3), 349-359. 
  
Al Manaseer, O. (2013). The effect of application of corporate governance rules on the performance of services  
Jordanian shareholding companies. Unpublished manuscript, 1-97. 
  
Amba, S. (2012). Corporate governance and firms’ financial performance. Journal of Academic and Business 
Ethics, 1-11. 
 
Ananzeh, I. (2016). Weak Form Efficiency of the Amman Stock Exchange: An Empirical Analysis (2000-2013). 
International Journal of Business and Management, 11(1), 173-180.   
    
Berger, A., et al. (2004). Corporate governance and bank performance: A joint analysis of the static, selection     
and dynamic effects of domestic, foreign, and state ownership. World Bank Conference on Bank privatization 
for helpful suggestions, 1-42. 
   
Black, B., et al. (2010). How Corporate Governance Affects Firm Value: Evidence on Channels from Korea. 
Social Science Research network, 1-53. 
 
Brown, L., and Caylor, M. (2009). Corporate governance and firm operating performance. Review of 
Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 32(2), 129-144. 
  
Brown, L., and Caylor, M. ( 2006). Corporate governance and firm valuation. Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, 25(4), 409-434. 
  
Dittmar, A., and J. Mahrt-Smith (2007). Corporate Governance and the Value of Cash Holdings. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 83(3), 599–634. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.12.006 
 
Eisenberg, T., et al. (1998). Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 48, 35- 54. 
 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.8, No.23, 2016 
 
163 
Emmanuel, A., and Hodo, R. (2012). Does Corporate Governance affect Bank Profitability? Evidence from 
Nigeria. American International Journal of Contemporary Research, 2 (7), 135-145. 
 
Fama, E. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. The Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288-
307. 
  
Fama, E., and Jensen, M. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 
301-325.  
 
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., and Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 118 (1), 107-156. 
 
Heenetigala, K., and Armstrong, A. (2011). The Impact of Corporate Governance on firm performance in an 
unstable economic and political environment: Evidence from Sri Lanka. Paper submitted to the 3rd Conference 
on Financial Markets and Corporate Governance, 1-17. 
 
Jaradat, M., and  Al-Zeaud, H. (2011). Testing the Weak-Form Efficiency of Amman Stock Exchange. 
International Research Journal of Finance & Economics, Issue 65, 93-98. 
  
Jensen, M., and Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs, and ownership 
structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4): 305-360. 
 
Maher, M., and Andersson, T. (1999). Corporate Governance: effects on firm performance and economic 
growth. Organization For Economic Co-Operation And Development, OECD 1999, from 
https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/2090569.pdf 
 
Mohamad, S. (2014). Random Prices’ Movement and Market Efficiency Level Evidence from Amman Stock 
Exchange. Dirasat: Administrative Sciences, 41(2), 417-423. 
  
Qabaja, A. (2008). The Impact of Corporate Governance Effectiveness on Financial Performance for Listed 
Companies on the Palestine Securities Exchange. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Amman Arab University. 
 
Rogers, M. (2008). Corporate Governance And Financial Performance Of Selected commercial Banks In 
Uganda. Queen's University Belfast, http://www.crrconference.org , 1-18. 
 
Sami, H., et al. (2011). Corporate Governance and Operating Performance of Chinese Listed Firms. Journal of 
International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 20(2), 106-114. doi:10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2011.06.005 
 
Singh, M., and Davidson, W. (2003). Agency Cost, Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms. Journal of Banking and Finance, 27(5), 793-816. doi: 10.1016/S0378-4266(01)00260-6 
 
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 40, 185-211. 
 
Amman Stock Exchange: www.ase.com.jo 
Securities Depository Center: www.sdc.com.jo 
 
 
 
 
